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Abstract
This paper uses a unique and recently available dataset that contains detailed information on 
firms from around the world to investigate factors that affect under-reporting behaviour by firms.  
The empirical strategy employed exploits the nature of the dependent variable, which is interval 
coded, and uses interval regression which provides an asymptotically more efficient estimator 
than the ordered probit, provided that the classical linear model assumptions hold.  These 
assumptions are investigated using standard diagnostic tests that have been modified for the 
interval regression model. Evidence is presented that shows that firms in all regions around the 
world engage in under-reporting.  Regression results indicate that government corruption has the 
single largest causal effect on under-reporting, resulting in the percentage of sales not reported to 
the tax authority being 53.4 percent higher.  Taxes have the second single largest causal effect on 
under-reporting, resulting in the percentage of sales not reported to the tax authority being 20.2 
percent higher.  Access to financing, organized crime, political instability and the fairness of the 
legal system were found to have no effect on under-reporting.  It is also found that there is a 
significant correlation between under-reporting and the legal organization of the business, size, 
age, ownership, competition and audit controls.  
Keywords: Underground Economy, Tax Non-compliance, Firm Characteristics, Interval 
Regression
JEL Classification: C24, D21, O17
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2Keeping it off the Books: An Empirical Investigation of Firms that Engage in Tax Evasion
1 Introduction
It is generally accepted that taxes and tax evasion are intrinsically linked; one cannot 
exist without the other.  As a result of a great deal of theoretical, experimental, and empirical
research conducted over the last twenty years, there exists an extensive knowledge base 
regarding tax evasion by individuals.  However, research regarding tax evasion1 by businesses is, 
by comparison, surprisingly modest. This is startling, given the importance of businesses and 
their decisions not only in economic models but also in tax systems and the economy as a whole.
Evidence does exist that supports the notion that there is cause for concern; that a 
substantial amount of income goes unreported to the tax authority.  Schneider (2006) reports 
estimates of unreported activities for 145 countries around the world (including transition, 
developing and developed countries) over the period 1999/2000 to 2002/2003.  He finds that the 
shadow economy averaged 42.3% of official GDP in developing African countries and 30% of 
official GDP in developing Asian countries, 39.6% in transitional countries in East and Central 
Europe and the former Soviet Republic, 16.5% in OECD countries, 21.7% in currently 
communist countries, and 33% of official GDP in countries in the South West Pacific Islands.2  
While estimates of the total size of the unreported activity, such as these, are valuable to 
                                                
1 The focus of this paper is on illegal tax evasion and not legal tax avoidance.  Tax evasion or tax non-compliance 
refers to income tax that is legally owed but is not reported or paid whereas tax avoidance refers to legal actions 
taken to reduce tax liability.  Tax avoidance includes such activities as “…purchasing tax-exempt bonds, which is 
certainly legal, not at all nefarious, but also certainly done for tax reasons.”  (Slemrod  2004, 4)  There exists a 
voluminous literature on corporate tax avoidance, notably work by James Hines at the University of Michigan, and 
interested readers are encouraged to consult this literature.
2 A number of detailed studies also exist that report estimates of the underground economy in specific countries.  For 
example: Tedds (2005) and Giles and Tedds (2002) report estimates for Canada; Draeseke and Giles (2002), Giles 
and Johnson (2002) Giles and Caragata (2001) and Giles (1999) report estimate for New Zealand; Bajada (1999) 
reports estimates for Australia; and Dell'Anno, Gomez-Antonia, and Pardo (2007) report estimates for France, 
Greece and Spain.
3understanding under-reporting behaviour in general, there is a great dealt that these estimates do 
not tell us. In particular, they do not distinguish between hidden legal activity (e.g. 
underreporting of profits or sales) and illegal or criminal activity (e.g. production and sale of 
illicit drugs, prostitution) and, more relevant to this paper, they are unable to distinguish between 
underreporting by individuals and firms.  This detailed information is important for policy 
makers since different policy tools are required to curb criminal behaviour than those required to 
curb hidden legal activity, the causal factors that drive under-reporting differ between individuals 
and firms, and firms may respond differently to policy changes aimed at curbing hidden activity 
than individuals.
One of the only existing estimates on the distribution of share of legally-generated 
income that goes unreported by firms is produced by the United States Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS).  The latest data from the IRS (2004) regarding the “tax gap” related to business activities 
are for the 2001 tax year.  These estimates, denoted in U.S. dollars, indicate that: (1) the 
corporate tax gap amounted to $29.9 billion, of which corporations with over $10 million in 
assets contributed $25.0 billion; (2) the tax gap associated with business income earned by 
individuals amounted to $81.2 billion; (3) the self-employed evaded $61.2 billion in employment 
tax; and (4) corporations underpaid the amount of taxes due based on reported income by $2.3 
billion.  In total, businesses evaded $174.6 billion in taxes, which amounted to almost 10% of 
total taxes paid voluntarily.  This is not an insignificant amount and yet should be considered a 
lower bound estimate because: it is based on twenty year old compliance rates; it does not 
include businesses that do not file tax returns (also known as non-filers, the hard-to-tax, ghosts or 
informal businesses); and/or it does not consider firms that are engaged in illegal activities.  
4Given that there is some evidence which supports the notion that businesses engage in tax 
non-compliance, several questions arise and require investigation.  First, do businesses around 
the world engage in tax evasion or is it confined to a few countries or regions?  Second, does the 
legal status of the business (e.g. sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, etc.) affect the 
incidence and/or intensity of tax evasion?  If so, then it may be possible to effect changes in the 
legal system in order to increase tax compliance.  Third, do businesses that engage in tax non-
compliance share common and observable characteristics, or is there too wide a variety of shapes 
and sizes to permit a useful generalization about them?  If it were possible to define a typical 
evader, the tax authority could target their auditing activities more accurately.  Finally, while 
there is considerable agreement internationally about the factors that likely trigger tax non-
compliance (e.g. the tax burden, the degree of regulation, the level of enforcement, confidence in 
government, labour force characteristics, and morality), how do these features influence the 
intensity of non-compliance?  With this information, policy makers could effect changes to 
increase the amount of tax revenues collected from businesses.
One of the main constraints to investigating and attempting to provide answers to these 
and related questions is the lack of data.  To date, most of the existing empirical research on firm 
tax evasion uses data from tax audits (e.g. Rice 1992; Chan and Mo 2000; Giles 2000; Hanlon et 
al. 2005). However, these sources are only available for a very small number of select countries, 
the data is costly to collect, and access to the data is limited.  In addition, tax audit data is subject 
to both selection and measurement error bias.  The selection effect occurs because firms are 
generally not randomly audited.  Rather, firms are usually selected for an audit because they 
have a particular characteristic (e.g. U.S. businesses with more than $10 million in assets are 
audited annually) or because their tax filing documents raise a “red-flag” with the tax authority.  
5The measurement error bias occurs because not only are audits unlikely to completely and 
accurately measure tax non-compliance but also the final non-compliance report is usually based 
on negotiations between the firm and the tax authority as well as various legal appeals.
More recently, however, an alternative data source has become available that is 
conducive to investigating issues related to business tax non-compliance namely, the World 
Business Environment Survey (WBES) which was hosted by the World Bank’s Enterprise 
Analysis Unit.  The survey was administered to more than 10,000 firms in eighty countries in 
late 1999 and early 2000, and provides information regarding a firm’s characteristics and well as 
responses to multiple questions on the investment climate and business environment.3  The 
survey also includes a question regarding the extent and intensity to which firms fail to report 
income to the tax authority.  Rather than reporting the exact amount of income that went 
unreported to the tax authority, firms were provided with seven possible intervals of varying size 
that were grouped according to the percentage of sales that are reported for tax purposes.  When 
a quantitative outcome is grouped into known intervals on a continuous scale the data is said to 
be interval-coded.  Asymptotically consistent estimates can be obtained using interval regression.  
The advantage of interval regression is that, provided certain key assumptions are met, the
coefficients on the exogenous variables can be interpreted as if ordinary least squares were 
applied to a continuous dependent variable.
Overall, and not surprisingly, high taxes and government corruption result in lower 
compliance and the magnitude of these effects are quite large.  It is found that government 
corruption has the single largest effect, resulting in the percentage of sales not reported to the tax 
                                                
3 An updated data set recently became available after the writing of this paper.  The Enterprise Survey data of the 
Enterprise Analysis unit has collected data, starting in 2002, on the investment climate in 97 countries for over 
60,000 firms. 
6authority being a whopping 53.4 percent higher, and taxes have the second largest effect, causing 
the percentage of sales not reported to the tax authority to be 20.2 percent higher.  Exchange 
rates have a positive effect on compliance, which is the only coefficient that fails to follow a 
priori expectations.  Access to capital, political instability, organized crime, inflation, and the 
legal system are found to have no statistically significant effect on tax non-compliance.  
It is also found that firms which are sole proprietorships and privately owned 
corporations report a smaller percentage of their sales to the tax authority.  The previous 
literature has suggested that firms in the service and construction sector should be less compliant 
and this study finds that firms in the service sector are more compliant.  It is likely this result 
stems from the fact that industry categories in the WBES are likely too broadly defined to obtain 
any significant relationship between industry sector and tax non-compliance.  For example, the 
service sector will include restaurants and hair salons as well as law and accounting firms.  There 
is no consensus in the previous literature about the relationship between firm size and under-
reporting, but it is found, unambiguously, that small firms are less and large firms are more 
compliant.  Government owned firms and firms that have audited financial statements are also 
more compliant, as was also found by other researchers, though foreign ownership and export 
status have no relationship with compliance.  
The paper begins with a review of the relevant tax evasion literature.  Section 3 describes
the WBES data.  Section 4 outlines the empirical technique used in this paper as well as a 
description of the key statistical assumption and associated tests.  The results are then 
summarized and discussed in Section 5.  The paper ends with some concluding comments.
72 Literature Review
As previously noted, extensive literature exists on tax evasion by individuals and the 
seminal contribution was provided by Allingham and Sandmo (1972).4  Their model was sparse 
but surprisingly robust in modeling an individual’s decision to evade taxes and, if so, how much 
to evade.  However, the theoretical outcomes are muddied when the choice is not only the level 
of evasion but also the level of output, as with most businesses, and when there is no direct link 
between the owner’s income, risk preference, audit probability, and evasion decisions.  This is 
particularly true for businesses where evasion decisions are made by managers and not the 
owner(s).  Hence, the reasons driving many businesses to evade taxes is likely different from that 
of individuals and, hence, should be modeled differently.  
There is a much smaller pool of literature that addresses tax non-compliance by 
businesses.5  The majority of this work utilizes the basic framework of the Allingham-Sandmo 
(1972) model, but the key variation in these models is that they explore how the tax rate, 
probability of detection, and penalty rate affect the two choices of evasion and output.6 These 
models, however, continues to assume that an individual is at the centre of the tax decision.  That 
is, that the firm owner makes the tax reporting decision.  This assumption, however, likely only 
applies to the self-employed and other small, privately-held businesses.  This suggests that the 
outcomes predicted by the Allingham-Sandmo (1972) model may not apply to other types of 
businesses, notably those businesses where financial decisions, including those related to taxes, 
are not made by the owner/shareholder but, rather, by their agents.  With this in mind, Chen and 
                                                
4 The Allingham-Sandmo (1972) model has been extended in a number of dimensions over the last thirty years (e.g. 
Watson 1985, Trandel and Snow 1999, Mookherjee and P’ng 1989, Border and Sobel 1987, Scotchmer 1987, 
Cremer, Marchand and Pestieau 1990, and Sanchez and Sobel (1993))  and this literature is nicely surveyed by 
Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002).
5 Cowell (2004) provides an excellent review of this literature.
6 There is no agreement in this literature if the firm in these models should be modeled as risk-averse or risk neutral.
8Chu (2002) extend the standard model to include a firm that hires a risk-averse manager who is 
offered some form of compensation (e.g. stock options, bonuses, etc.) as an incentive to engage 
in tax evasion on behalf of the firm (a principle-agent type model).  Under this model, a firm will 
evade tax only when the expected profit from evasion is significantly greater.  This is because tax 
evasion by a business actually involves the interaction of many agents and is much more 
complicated than individual income tax evasion.  Crocker and Slemrod (2005) extend this further 
to consider the role of penalties in the tax evasion decision.  Not unsurprisingly, the model 
implies that corporate tax evasion is reduced when penalties are imposed on the CFO directly, as 
opposed to the shareholder, and that tax evasion increases if the CFO’s compensation contract 
optimally adjusts to offset the penalties imposed when evasion is detected.  
The theoretical findings clearly suggest that the type of business, whether it be owner 
managed or otherwise, along with other factors such as tax rates, audit rates, and penalties 
greatly affects the tax evasion decision of firms.  Whether or not these theoretical results hold 
remains unclear however due to the fact that empirical analysis of business tax evasion is not 
extensive and this is mainly due to a lack of data.  There have, however, been a small number of 
empirical studies that will be summarized here.
A number of studies have been conducted on tax non-compliance by the self-employed.  
The self-employed are commonly believed to have lower compliance rates than wage and salary 
earners, primarily due to a lack of third-party reporting and withholding.  One approach,
popularized by Pissarides and Weber (1989), uses household income and expenditure data to 
estimate the degree of income under-reporting.  This approach, along with various modifications, 
has been applied by: Apel (1994) and Engstom and Holmulnd (2006) for Sweden; Schuetze
(2002) and Tedds (2007) for Canada; Lyssiotou et al. (2004) for Great Britain; and Feldman and 
9Slemrod (2006) for the United States.  U.S. tax audit data has also been used to explore tax 
evasion by the self-employed and these studies include Christian (1994), Erard (1992), and 
Joulfaian and Rider (1998).
Several studies have investigated business tax non-compliance using data from tax audits.  
Probably the most comprehensive tax audit dataset in the world is the U.S. IRS Tax Compliance 
Measurement Program (TCMP).7  Rice (1992) used TCMP data from 1980 to investigate tax 
compliance by small corporations (defined as corporations with assets between $1 and $10 
million).  His findings suggest four key results.  First, compliance is higher among publicly 
traded corporations, which he attributes to the requirement that publicly traded corporations must 
disclose more information to the public about their operations.8  Second, high profit companies 
are more likely to under-report their income, and corporations whose profits are below the 
industry mean tend to resort to non-compliance, perhaps as a means of limiting costs.  Third, the 
marginal tax rate is negatively associated with compliance.  Finally, firm size and tax non-
compliance are positively related, and corporations engaging in tax non-compliance appear to be 
geographically bundled.  The latter finding is interesting and may be evidence that the 
compliance behaviour of others directly affects ones own compliance behaviour.  Joulfaian 
(2000), using TCMP data from 1987, found that non-compliant corporations are three time more 
likely to be managed by executives who have evaded personal taxes.  
Hanlon et al. (2005) are the first to the use operational data from the Voluntary 
Compliance Baseline Measurement (VCBLM) program compiled by the Large and Mid-Sized 
                                                
7 The TCMP features data from a random sample of individual and small corporate income tax returns filed in a 
given year that were subject to intensive audits by experienced examiners.  For certain groups, such as non-filers and 
proprietors who tend to not report a significant amount of their income, the results from special research studies are 
used to supplement TCMP data.  Finally, data for large corporations are obtained from routine operational audits.
8 Tannenbaum (1993), however, disagrees with this statement and instead argues that higher compliance could be 
the result of managers in these corporations having greater independence from the owners.
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Business (LMSB) Research Division of the IRS to examine corporate tax non-compliance, as 
measured by deficiencies identified during audit.  This data is more up to date, containing audit 
files up to and including 2002, than the TCMP, which ended in 1988.  They find that business 
tax non-compliance relative to scale is a convex function, with medium-sized businesses (within 
the population of firms with assets exceeding $10 million) having the lowest rate of non-
compliance.  Private firms, multinationals and firms with incentivized executive compensation 
schemes are associated with higher non-compliance (providing empirical evidence for the 
predictions from the model proposed by Crocker and Slemrod (2005)) while foreign controlled 
firms are more compliant.  In general, firms in the manufacturing industry, trade, transportation 
and warehousing industry, and education, healthcare and warehousing industry are less 
compliant.  They also find no association between compliance and effective tax rates.
Giles (2000) discusses some of the factors that determine the probability of non-
compliance among a very large population of New Zealand businesses that were audited by the 
Inland Revenue Department in that country between 1993 and 1995. Contrary to Rice (1992) and 
Hanlon et al. (2005), Giles finds that an increase in the scale of the business, regardless of how 
this is measured, unambiguously raises the probability of compliance, once other characteristics 
are controlled for.  That is, businesses that are relatively small, in terms of sales revenue or 
before-tax profit, are more likely to evade taxes than are large corporations, all other things being 
equal.  Businesses in the construction, wholesale trade, retail trade, accommodation, and cafes 
and restaurants sectors exhibited below-average compliance rates over the study period.  He also 
considers several other characteristics that were found to be important in reducing the tax 
compliance rate among New Zealand businesses. Relatively inefficient businesses tended to be 
less compliant than more efficient ones, where efficiency was defined as either “return on net 
11
assets”, or “activity ratio” (sales as a percentage of net assets).  In addition, businesses which 
were registered off-shore were generally more compliant than their on-shore counterparts, a 
finding that is shared by Hanlon et al. (2005). Finally, it was found that in general, an aggressive 
use of legitimate tax-minimization instruments (i.e. tax avoidance behaviour such as the 
deduction of interest and depreciation costs, and the writing-off of bad debts) tended to be 
associated with increased compliance.
Many countries use tax holidays to attract foreign investment by providing a limited 
period of tax exemptions and reductions for qualified investors.  Chan and Mo (2000) examine 
the effect of tax holidays on foreign investors’ tax non-compliance behaviour in China.  They 
analyzed 583 tax audit cases, made available by the Chinese tax authorities, on corporate tax 
non-compliance by foreign investors.  Their results indicate that the corporate taxpayers tax 
holiday position significantly affects non-compliance, notably: (1) companies in the pre-holiday 
position are least compliant; (2) companies are most compliant in the tax exemption period that 
has a zero tax rate and a heavy penalty for evasion; (3) domestic market-oriented companies 
have a higher rate of non-compliance than their export-oriented counterparts; and (4) wholly 
foreign-owned and manufacturing-oriented companies have higher compliance than joint 
ventures and service-oriented companies.
Only two studies appear to exist which use data on firm-reported tax non-compliance
rather than audit data.  Using firm level data from a 1997 survey of private manufacturing firms 
in Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and the Ukraine, Johnson et al. (2000) investigate the 
relationship between government corruption, criminal activities, and firm tax compliance.  The 
dependent variable (percentage of sales that are unreported to the tax authority) is similar to that 
which is used in this paper except that it is a continuous variable (rather than grouped data as in 
12
the WBES).9  The authors found a positive and significant relationship between under-reporting 
of sales and bribing of corrupt officials, but no relationship between under-reporting of sales and 
protection payments to the mafia, tax payments, or efficiency of the legal system.  Finally, firm 
tax non-compliance was greater in Russia and the Ukraine than in the other countries included in 
the study.
Batra et al. (2003) were the first to use the WBES to investigate the determinants of 
under-reporting by firms.  The WBES asks each firm to provide an estimate of the percentage of 
sales revenues that firms like their own report to the tax authority.  Rather than the answer being 
recorded on a continuous scale, seven answers were possible: 100%, 90-99%, 80-89%, 70-79%, 
60-69%, 50-59%, and less than 50%.  The authors define seven binary variables based on these 
seven intervals and each binary variable takes a value of one if the firm selected the particular 
interval of interest and zero otherwise. They then estimate seven different OLS regressions 
which include variables for firm characteristics, rule of law, business constraints and country 
fixed effects.  Overall they find that: (1) “…small or medium-size firms that produce for the 
domestic market (non-exporters), lack foreign investment, and are located in large cities (but not 
necessarily in the capital) tend to engage more in unofficial activity” (p. 76); (2) the prevalence, 
though not the unpredictability, of corruption also significantly affects non-compliance; and (3) 
“…a firm’s age, sector or mode of ownership do not influence [a firm’s] under-reporting of 
revenue.” (p. 78).  
There are several reasons to be concerned about these reported results.  First, the number 
of observations in each of the seven regressions ranged from a low of 3,802 to a high of 4,781
                                                
9 The question regarding the percentage of sales not reported used by Johnson et al. was prefaced by “It is thought 
that many firms in your industry, in order to survive and grow, may need to misreport their operational and financial 
results.  Please estimate the degree of under-reporting by firms in your area of activity.”  
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from a total number of observations of over 10,000 available in the WBES.  The authors do not 
discuss the reasons for the attrition but it is likely the result of missing observations and non-
response for both the dependent and independent variable.  As attrition of this magnitude can 
lead to biased results, it is important that it be investigated further.  Second, the authors do not 
link their choice of explanatory variables to the existing theoretical or empirical literature 
regarding firm tax non-compliance.  As a result, some potential controls are overlooked and 
some controls may be mis-specified.  Third, the equations across categories are not all identically 
specified and it is not clear if the results should be compared across regressions, given the 
different specifications.  Finally, Batra et al. (2003) do not exploit the nature of the dependent 
variable.  The firm’s response regarding under-reporting behaviour is grouped into categories.  
When a quantitative outcome is grouped into known intervals on a continuous scale, the data are 
said to be “interval-coded”.10  However, Batra et al. (2003) define the dependent variable as a 
binary outcome for each category and estimate the resulting equations by Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS).  The considerable statistical limitations of such a linear probability model are well 
known.11  There is an estimation technique that has been developed specifically for interval-
coded data.  This estimation procedure is known as “interval regression” and is undertaken using 
maximum likelihood techniques.  
This paper addresses these shortcomings.  First, it uses the interval regression technique 
and the extent to which various covariates affect the estimation results is also explored.  Second,
information from existing theoretical and empirical literature of firm tax non-compliance is used 
                                                
10 When the interval thresholds are unknown and have to estimated along with the other parameters, an ordered 
logit/probit is the preferred estimation framework.
11 In the WBES, over 40% of the firms surveyed indicate that 100% of their sales are reported to the tax authority 
and between 6-14% of firms appear in one of the other categories.  This means that the linear probability models 
estimated by Batra et al. will be either zero or one inflated.  This results in a large number of predicted probabilities 
falling outside the unit interval.
14
to build the empirical model explored in this paper.  Third, the issue of missing observations or 
non-response is explored.  This paper also builds on the findings of Johnson et al. by extending 
the number of countries included in the sample and examines firms in a variety of different 
industries.
3 Data
In 1998, the World Bank Group launched its World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES).  The WBES used many of the same questions from the enterprise survey conducted for 
the 1997 World Development Report12 (World Bank 1997) but expanded the number of 
businesses and countries surveyed and the questions/issues covered.  The survey is a sample 
from the universe of registered businesses.13  The WBES uses a form of stratified random 
sampling along with oversampling and nonrandom methods to correct for biases in the 
representation across firms with respect to industry characteristics that were not common.14  To 
ensure adequate representation of firms by industry, size, ownership, export orientation, and 
location, sampling targets were agreed on across all regions.  
The survey was completed by over 10,000 firms across eighty countries, including the 
West Bank and Gaza over a 20 month period between the latter half of 1998 and mid-2000.  
Table 2 lists the countries available in the data set by region along with the associated sample 
size.  Approximately, one third of these countries were low income, one half were middle 
income and a little less than one fifth were high income.  Private contractors, rather than 
                                                
12 Unfortunately, this dataset contains neither detailed information on characteristics of the firms nor the key 
variable of interest contained in the WBES dataset.  As a result, it cannot be appended to the WBES dataset.
13 It is very difficult to obtain information on unregistered or informal suppliers.  Smith and Adams (1987) 
endeavored to do so by examining the extent of tax non-compliance by informal suppliers in six “at risk” sectors 
using results from a survey commissioned by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on the expenditures made by 
consumers on goods and services provided by these suppliers.  For the 1992 tax year, the authors find that 
unreported income by these informal suppliers amounted to approximately US$59.6 billion and that informal 
suppliers tend to report only about 20% of their net business income.
14 Unfortunately, the survey does not contain survey weights.  The lack of survey weights means that individual 
indicators should not be used for precise country rankings in any particular dimension measured by the survey.
15
government entities, conduct the survey on behalf of the World Bank to ensure confidentiality 
and the greatest degree of participation.  The survey is completed by managing directors, 
accountants, human resource managers and other company staff.  The purpose of the survey was 
to assess and compare the business environment in a large number of countries.  To achieve this 
goal, the survey gathered information regarding the firm’s characteristics, such as size and 
ownership structure, as well as responses to multiple questions on the investment climate and the 
local business environment as shaped by domestic economic policy, governance, regulatory, 
infrastructural, and financial impediments, as well as assessments of public service quality.  A 
more detailed description of the survey can be found in Batra et al. (2003).   
Of interest to this study, the survey included a question regarding the extent and intensity 
to which firms fail to report income to the tax authority which permits exploring the links 
between tax non-compliance and various firm, business, governance, and political 
characteristics.15  The main advantages of using the WBES to explore tax evasion over audit data 
include the fact that: (1) audit data are not widely available, unlike the WBES, which covers 
eighty countries; (2) audit data only include firms that are selected (for diverse reasons) or 
caught by the tax authorities, while the WBES is a broad sample of firms; and (3) the WBES 
includes additional information that is not included in tax audits. In particular, factors that firms 
perceive as business obstacles, such as taxes and regulations, which may effect a firm’s decision 
to under-report, are included.  
The WBES does not come without disadvantages.  One disadvantage shared by both the 
WBES and audit data is that neither data source includes “ghosts” (Erard and Ho 2001); firms 
that operate solely in cash and avoid normal business obstacles and regulations.  The effect of 
                                                
15 Similar to the data used by Johnson et al., the exact phrasing of the question was “What percentage of total sales 
would you estimate the typical firm in your area of activity reports for tax purposes?”  
16
omitting these firms from the estimates will bias estimates of tax non-compliance downwards 
and this bias will be larger for those countries that have a larger percentage of unregistered firms.   
Further, the percentage of sales that the firm fails to report to the tax authority is not expressed in 
actual quantities, as with Johnson et al. (2000), but rather it is expressed in intervals.  As 
discussed above, there were seven possible answers: 100%, 90-99%, 80-89%, 70-79%, 60-69%, 
50-59%, and less than 50%.   This represents something of a constraint but its key advantage is 
that the interval-coded nature of the responses is likely to reduce a respondent’s reporting bias.  
The large number of intervals, most of them of equal size, is beneficial as it provides information 
on the scale of under-reporting rather than simply its incidence.  Given that the incidence of 
under-reporting is relatively high, as will be shown below, information on the scale of under-
reporting is extremely useful.16
The distribution of answers to the sales reporting question over the entire sample is given 
in Table 1a. The first column of the table indicates that just over 18% of the firms in the sample 
did not respond to the question of interest.  It is quite common in survey data to have missing 
data of this nature.  If the data is missing for unknown reasons and the missing data is unrelated 
to the completeness of the other observations then it is reasonable to exclude the missing 
observations from the analysis, though efficiency is sacrificed.  If, however, the missing data are 
systematically related to the phenomenon being modeled then there will be a sample selection 
problem.  For example, if firms whose response is missing for the sales reporting question are 
more likely to be firms who under-report their income, then the missing observations represent 
more than just missing information.  Unfortunately, there is insufficient evidence to definitively 
                                                
16 Further, the interval coding of the data along with the lack of data on the dollar amount of sales for the firms 
surveyed in the WBES means that the tax gap cannot be calculated.  The tax gap is the difference between the taxes 
paid and the taxes that should have been paid.  Such a calculation is useful in determining the amount of tax 
revenues lost to non-compliance.
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ascertain the reasons for the missing observations in this particular case.  Rather, the relationship 
between these missing observations and firm characteristics that will be used as explanatory 
variables in our model were explored.  If the missing observations are randomly distributed 
amongst these explanatory variables then this provides some evidence that the missing 
information may not cause systematic bias in the estimates.  There appeared to be no significant 
systematic relationship between nonresponse to the sales reporting question and the explanatory 
variables, with one exception noted below.  Since no obvious explanation is available for the 
missing observation on the sales reporting questions, these observations (1,716) were dropped 
from the data set leaving 8,153 observations.    
Of the firms that responded to the sales reporting question, Table 1b shows that 60% of 
firms worldwide indicate that the typical firm fails to report their sales in full to the tax authority 
and, of those firms, over 19% of them fail to report more than half their sales.  This shows that 
business tax compliance is a significant issue.  Not surprisingly, there appears to be some 
differences in perceived tax non-compliance across regions, as is shown in Figure 1.  In 
particular, in OECD countries only approximately 40% of firms’ under-report their sales to the 
tax authority and of those, approximately 50% fail to report only up to 10% of their sales.  
Further, compared to other regions, significantly more firms in Latin America and Asia fail to 
report more than 50% of their sales.  In addition, there are significant differences in perceived 
firm tax compliance across countries.  
There are, however, some differences in the distribution of the missing observations 
discussed above with respect to region and country.  Only 11% of firms located in the former 
Soviet Union, approximately 15% of firms in the OECD and Latin America, approximately 20% 
in Asian and Africa and the Middle East, and 27% in Transition Europe failed to respond to the 
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sales reporting question.  The missing observations appear to be randomly allocated amongst the 
countries in Latin America and Africa and the Middle East.  In Transition Europe, no firm 
located in Albania responded to the question, indicating that survey was not carried out in a 
similar fashion to that in other countries rather than a response bias.  As a result, Albania is 
excluded from the analysis (163 observations).  Higher non-response also occurs in Malaysia, 
India and Thailand in Asia and Russia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine in the Former 
Soviet Union but in all cases the non-response rate is not dramatically higher from that 
experienced in other countries in the regions.  In the OECD, France, Canada and the United 
States all have a higher response rate than the other countries in the group but again the 
difference is not alarming.
4 Empirical Framework
4.1 Interval Regression Model
As discussed above, the survey question which forms the basis for the dependent variable 
refers to categories.  As a result, a firm’s reporting behaviour is not directly observed.  Rather, 
firms are categorized on the basis of the percentage of sales that go unreported.  When a 
quantitative outcome is grouped into known intervals on a continuous scale, the data is said to be 
“interval-coded”.  An ordered probit (or logit) is ideal when the dependent variable is discrete, 
ordinal in nature, and when the categories or thresholds are unknown.17  In this case, the 
thresholds are estimated along with the model’s coefficients and the variance of the error term is 
normalized to be one.  It is possible, however, to modify the ordered probit model so that the 
thresholds are fixed at their known values and only the coefficients and the error variance are 
                                                
17 That is, for an ordered logit/probit model, while it can be said that two is greater than one, it cannot be determined
if the difference between two and one is somehow twice as important as the difference between one and zero.  The 
latter is not true of interval coded data.
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estimated.  This estimation procedure is known as “interval regression” and is undertaken using 
maximum likelihood techniques.  The key advantage of interval regression over the ordered 
probit is that it provides an asymptotically more efficient estimator as it uses the known 
threshold information and involves estimating fewer parameters.  It is also preferred to OLS, as 
OLS on the grouped dependent variable model is inconsistent.18  
The following is the general setup of the model and is based on the discussion contained 
in Stewart (1983).  The responses for the dependent variable are coded 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 to 
capture seven distinct sales under-reporting categories.  Let iy  denote the observable ordinal 
variable coded in this way for the ith firm and let *iy  denote the underlying variable that captures 
the sales under-reporting of the ith firm.  This can be expressed as a linear function of a vector of 
explanatory variables ix  using the following relationship:
* ' 2, ~ (0, ).i i i iy x u u N   (1)
It is assumed that *iy  is related to the observable ordinal variable iy  as follows:
1iy  if %49* iy
2iy  if %59%49 *  iy
3iy  if %69%59 *  iy
4iy  if %79%69 *  iy      (2)
5iy  if %89%79 *  iy
6iy  if %99%89 *  iy
                                                
18 Another popular alternative is to define an artificial dependent variable that takes the value of the midpoint of the 
reported interval and then estimate the model by OLS.  The resulting estimates are inconsistent but can be 
transformed using a minimum χ2 method and the transformed estimates are consistent.  However, the transformation 
requires equally strong distributional assumptions, usually that of normality and homoskedasticity, to that required 
of the interval regression model.
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7iy  if %99* iy
Based on the above, the seven possible components of the general log likelihood function 
for the ith individual is expressed as:
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(3)
where   denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal, 0)(  , 
1)(  , elog (·) denotes the natural logarithmic operator, and I[·] is an indicator function that 
takes the value of one when the statement in the square brackets is true and zero when it is false.  
The relevant part of the log-likelihood is then triggered by the indicator function for whether the 
individual falls within one of the seven intervals in question.  The maximum likelihood 
procedure now involves the estimation of the β parameter vector and the ancillary standard error 
parameter σ.  
4.2 Diagnostic Tests
Unlike the situation with the ordered probit estimation, the estimated coefficients from an 
interval regression are interpretable as if *iy  is observed for each i and estimated xxyE )|( *
by OLS.  That is, the estimated coefficients can be interpreted as the marginal effects (i.e. the 
change in percentage of sales reported given a change in the independent variable, holding all 
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else constant).  It should be noted that the estimates contained in the β parameter vector are only 
interpretable in this way due to the assumption that y* given x satisfies the classical linear model 
assumptions.  If these assumptions do not hold then the interval regression estimator of β would 
be inconsistent.  As a result, it is important to test the key assumptions of functional form,
homoskedasticity, and normality, all of which are used to derive the log likelihood function
noted in equation (3).  Unfortunately, these assumptions, despite their importance, are seldom 
tested in applied research.  Equally, these assumptions, particularly homoskedasticity and 
normality, are rarely met when using micro data.  
Chesher and Irish (1987) outline diagnostic tests for (pseudo) functional form, normality 
and homoskedasticity for the ordered probit model that are easily modified for the interval 
regression model.19  These tests are all score (or Lagrange Multiplier) tests for which the test 
statistics take the form
1')'('1 1 FFFF  (4)
where 1 is an n-dimensional vector of ones, and F is a matrix with row order n where each row 
contains the score contributions for all the parameters of the model.   can be easily calculated 
as n times the non-centered R2 from a regression of 1 on the columns of F.
The construction of the F matrices for these tests, which are described below, are based 
on computations of the pseudo-residuals.  Usually, residuals are defined as the difference 
between the observed and estimated values of the dependent variable.  However, the estimated 
values of the dependent variable obtained in the interval regression have no counterpart in the 
                                                
19 While it is worthwhile considering the results of the aforementioned tests, care should be exercised when 
interpreting the associated results.  Orme (1990) has questioned the use of such score tests in the context of a simple 
binary probit and demonstrated their poor finite sample properties in this setting.  In particular, he notes that there is 
upward size-distortion. Assuming that these findings extend to the interval regression model, the diagnostic tests 
may indicate that the model does not satisfy the classical linear model assumptions when in fact it does.  However, 
the sample size for the data used in this paper is large enough that this concern likely does not apply.
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data.  Rather, pseudo-errors need to be computed.  An expression for the pseudo-errors is 
obtained by differentiating equation (3) with respect to σ and denoted for the ith individual as:
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where )( denotes the probability density function for the standard normal, and aj-1 and aj denote 
the known interval parameters for individual i (e.g. if yi=2 then aj-1=49 and aj=59).  The pseudo-
residuals, ei, are obtained by replacing the unknown parameters in (5) with their maximum 
likelihood estimates.  
For the homoskedasticity and non-normality tests, higher-order moment residuals are 
required, specified as:
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The higher-order moment residuals are obtained by replacing the unknown parameters in (6) 
with their maximum likelihood estimates.  The first four moment residuals are required for the 
desired tests and are defined as follows:
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The F matrix, or score contributions, is obtained by multiplying the pseudo-residuals by the 
various auxiliary variables in question.
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4.2.1 Pseudo-Functional Form Test
The (pseudo) functional form test is a modified version of the RESET test (Ramsey 
1969).  F is given as
),ˆ,...,ˆ,( 2*12*11 eyeyexeF K (8)
where x includes a column of 1’s if the grouped model contains an intercept and Ky*ˆ  is the Kth
power of model’s predicted standardized index, 
ˆ
ˆ
'
*
x
y  .  That test statistic   is distributed 
as )1(2 K .  If the null hypothesis is rejected, this is evidence of model misspecification that 
may be rectified by considering additional variables and/or alternative functional forms (such as 
a semi-log model).
4.2.2 Test for Homoskedasticity
For the test of homoskedasticity, F is given as
),( 21 idexeF  20 (9)
The test statistic   is distributed as )(2 q  where q is equal to the number of variables that are 
interacted with e2.  If the form of the heteroskedasticity is unknown, then 'xxdi  .  This is 
simply White’s test for heteroskedasticity of unknown form, modified for the interval regression 
model.  The test is sensitive to model misspecification so if the test for (pseudo) functional form 
is rejected, it is also likely that the test for homoskedasticity will also be rejected.
As indicated previously, the estimated coefficients are inconsistent in the presence of 
uncorrected heteroskedasticity but it is possible to address this inconsistency by correcting for
heteroskedasticity.  Typically, the Huber (1967) “sandwich” estimator of the variance is used in 
                                                
20 When an intercept is estimated so that x always contains a unit element, e2 is redundant in the test for 
homoskedasticity.
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place of the conventional Maximum Likelihood variance estimator.  This estimator is expressed 
as:
1 ' 2 1ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) [ ( )] ( )[ ( )]i i iVar I x e x I    (5)
where )ˆ(I  is the information matrix for the ˆ  vector, computed at the maximum likelihood 
estimates.  However, unlike with linear regression, in an interval regression model is it not 
possible to correctly specify )|( * xyE  but misspecify Var(y*|x) which implies that the validity of 
this correction is highly questionable in the interval regression model and, hence, is not used in 
this paper.  In this situation, the preferred choice is to correct for heteroskedasticity using a 
variation of Harvey’s (1976) multiplicative heteroskedasticity, denoted as Var(ui)=exp(diγ)2
where di is a matrix of independent variables, including a column of one’s, that are the source of 
the heteroskedasticity and γ is a coefficient vector.  The expression exp(diγ) replaces the σ noted 
in equation (3).21
4.2.3 Non-Normality Test
Finally, F in the usual )2(2  test for zero skewness and/or excess kurtosis is given by
),,,( 4321 eeexeF  (10)
4.3 Explanatory & Control Variables
As was outlined above, previous empirical work using audit data found relationships 
between tax non-compliance and various economic, political, and firm characteristics and these 
relationships will also be explored in this paper. Generally anything that is perceived by the firm 
as affecting their ability conduct business provides incentive for the firm to engage in tax non-
compliance, in part to reduce costs and be more competitive, but it is generally acknowledge that 
                                                
21 In STATA, the heteroskedastic corrected interval regression model is estimated using the ‘het’ option on the 
‘intreg’ command.
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factors such as high tax rates, corruption, extortion by organized crime, and the legal 
environment are primary drivers of tax evasion.  It is widely acknowledged high taxes, whether 
they be corporate, payroll, and/or sales taxes, provide incentives for firms to hide output to 
reduce their tax burden.  If corruption is common, then among other effects, it will increase the 
cost of business, reduce morality, and reduce a firm’s confidence in government; all of which are 
likely to have a negative relationship with tax compliance.  The relationship between tax 
compliance and inconsistency in the application of laws and regulations, however, is more 
ambiguous.  If a firm can individually garner the favour of the government(s) and/or courts in the 
interpretation and application of laws and regulations, then this may reduce tax non-compliance.  
On the other hand, if the firm does not benefit from this inconsistency, then it may resort to tax 
non-compliance.
Others drivers of firm tax non-compliance include: access to capital, inflation, exchange 
rate, political instability, and regulatory burden.  Andreoni (1992) argues that “…individuals 
facing binding borrowing constraints may use tax evasion to transfer resources from the future to 
the present.  Even if a person finds tax evasion undesirable in the absence of borrowing 
constraints, it could become desirable if a borrowing constraint is binding.  Tax evasion, 
therefore, may be a high-risk substitute for a loan.” (p. 35-36).  Price inflation may influence 
under-reporting in two ways.  First, if tax rates are not indexed then the tax burden rises simply 
due to “bracket creep”.  Second, inflation generates uncertainty and businesses may hedge 
against this uncertainty by engaging in (more) underground activity.  Exchange rates can be an 
obstacle to doing business if the exchange rate is unpredictable and can increase the input costs 
faced by businesses.  Various governmental factors can also influence under-reporting.  Political 
instability constrains a countries ability to collect taxes and also reduces the efficiency of 
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collection, thereby increasing non-compliance.  The degree of regulation is often cited as a factor 
that influences people to engage in underground activity as regulations reduce a firms’ freedom 
of choice (e.g. Deregulation Commission 1991 and Schneider and Enste 2000).
Various characteristics of the firm will also be included as control variables.  The 
previous literature makes it clear that tax non-compliance likely varies across governance 
models.  The WBES provides an opportunity to explore the relationship between the legal 
structure of the business and tax non-compliance. Based on the literature, it is expected that 
publicly traded corporations will be the most compliant.  In most countries, publicly traded 
corporations have a greater probability of being audited and are subject to public disclosure 
requirements and independent financial auditing, which tends to expose any under-reporting 
behaviour to the authorities.  As audit levels and detection probability are greater, compliance 
should be higher.  Industry sector, firm size, number of competitors, age, ownership, export 
status, and whether the firm subjects its financial statements to audits will also be included.  
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the key variables described in this section.
5 Results
The first task is to specify the values of the two end intervals, denoted above as a0 and aK
in Equation (3).  The values of -, 0, and 1 are considered for the values of a0.  It is difficult to 
argue that a firm would report less than 0% of their sales.  Instead, it could be argued that the 
first interval should begin at either 1 or 0%: 1% since it can be argued that firms that report 0% 
of their sales would likely be operating completely as “ghosts” and would not have been selected 
for an interview since there would be no formal record of the firm.  The results are quite 
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insensitive to the choice of a0 hence the value of a0 is set to 1%, which seems economically 
reasonable given the sampling design which excluded unregistered firms.  
The values of  and 100 are considered for the values of aK.  When the last interval is 
treated as open ended (aK=), the maximum predicted value is in excess of 140% and over 25% 
of the predicted values exceed 100%.  These numbers seem economically implausible, 
particularly that over 25% of firms report in excess of 100% of their sales to the tax authority.  
Hence, the last interval is set to 100.  With the bounds of the intervals set at 1 and 100, the 
maximum predicted value is approximately 105% and approximately 1% of the predicted values 
exceed 100%.  These figures seem to be economically plausible and accord with the findings of 
Rice (1992) who found that 6% firms do over-report to some extent.    In particular, firms may 
over-report due to a misinterpretation of tax laws, to avoid a tax audit, to secure financing, or 
particularly for public corporations, to appear more competitive.  In the WBES, firms that over-
report will likely be included in the full compliance category.  The effect of choosing different 
values for a0 and aK on the resulting estimates will be explored.  It should be noted that the 
sensitivity of the results and predicted values to the treatment of the end intervals is often 
overlooked in the literature yet can be of clear importance to the economic validity of the 
resulting estimates.
Prior to estimation, it is important to consider the necessary assumptions for consistent 
estimates and in particular, the assumption of normality.  It is anticipated that the assumption of 
normality is likely violated in this model.  Table 1b clearly shows that the distribution of sales 
reporting is negatively skewed.  Normality may be more closely approximated by taking the 
natural logarithm of 100 minus the dependent variable, which is simply the natural logarithm of 
the percentage of sales not reported to the tax authority.  Such a transformation requires that the 
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dependent variable take only strictly positive values and care exercised in interpreting the 
resulting estimates.  In particular, the coefficients in such a model are no longer marginal effects 
but 100 multiplied by the estimated coefficient represents the percentage change.22  Preliminary 
investigation supports this transformation and is the specification used to obtain the results 
reported here.
The results are presented in Table 4.  The basic model is presented in the first column 
(Model 1a).  Various goodness of fit measures and the results from the various diagnostic tests 
are reported near the end of the Table.  Larger (less negative) log-likelihood values are indicative 
of a better fit. The log-likelihood values can be compared across the models only if they have the 
same samples and dependent variable.  The R-square, for technical reasons, cannot be computed 
in the same way in interval regressions as it is in OLS regression.  Various pseudo R-square 
measures, however, have been proposed, but there is no generally accepted measure.  Veall and 
Zimmermann (1996) recommend the measure of McKelvey and Zavoina (1975), which is 
reported in Table 4.23  
For model 1a, the null of correct functional form is not rejected at all the usual 
significance levels, but the tests for homoskedasticity and normality are both rejected at the usual 
significance levels.  Plots of the pseudo residuals from this models supports the finding of non-
normality and it is not clear if any further transformations of the dependent variable, beyond 
those already pursued, would result in normality.  In addition, further transformations would 
                                                
22 Kennedy (1981), however, notes that in a semi-log model the coefficient on a dummy variable must be 
appropriately transformed.  That is, if bi is the estimated coefficient on a dummy variable and V(bi) is the estimated 
variance of bi then )1)
2
)(
(exp(100  iii
bV
bg
gives an estimate of the percentage impact of the dummy variable 
on the dependent variable.  The effect of this transformation on the resulting coefficients was explored.  As the 
resulting change to the coefficients reported in Table 6 were marginal, the results are not reported but are available 
from the author upon request.
23 The McKelvey and Zavoina (1975) R-square is computed in STATA with the 'fitstat' command.
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make it difficult to interpret the estimated coefficients.  It is, however, possible to correct for the 
heteroskedasticity, as noted above, if a form for it is specified.  Correcting for the 
heteroskedasticity can often achieve normality in the (pseudo) residuals.  It is not unreasonable 
to assume that much of the heteroskedasticity results from countries and business type.  
Applications of the test for homoskedasticity of known form across subsets of the variables 
confirm this suspicion.24  Model 1a is re-estimated to account for this known form of the 
heteroskedasticity and these results are presented in Table 4 under the column heading Model 1b.  
These results will now be discussed.
With respect to the causal variables, firms that perceive high taxes and regulations, and 
government corruption as obstacles to doing businesses report significantly less of their sales to 
the tax authority.   The results presented in Table 4 indicate that government corruption has the 
single largest effect, resulting in the percentage of sales not reported to the tax authority being a 
whopping 53.4 percent higher and taxes at 20.2 percent higher.  In comparison, Johnson et al.
(2000) also found a positive relationship between non-compliance and government corruption 
but failed to find a relationship between compliance and tax payments.  Exchange rates have a 
positive effect on compliance, which is the only coefficient that fails to follow a priori
expectations.  All other variables are statistically insignificant.
The control variables also provide interesting results and these results also accord with 
those obtained using tax audit data.  Sole proprietorships and private corporations are the least 
compliant form business of all the business models included in this study.  This result accords 
with those found by Rice (1992), that found that public corporations were more compliant than 
other types of firms, and Hanlon et al. (2005) who found that private corporations were less 
                                                
24 The results are not reported but are available from the author upon request.
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compliant.  Small firms, and firms with more than three competitors are also found to be the least 
compliant while large firms and firms with no competitors are more compliant.  Giles (2000) 
reports a similar result with respect to size, whereas Rice (2002) found firm size and tax non-
compliance were positively related and Hanlon et al. (2005) found that compliance was a convex 
function over firm size.  Finally, being foreign, government owned, and having financial 
statements audited all lead to significantly higher compliance.  Both Giles (2000) and Chan and 
Mo (2000) found that foreign owned firms are more compliant, and the results in Table 6 provide 
further support for this result.   The relationship between internal audit controls of the firm and 
tax compliance has not been investigated in previous empirical work.
Numerically, the percentage of sales not reported to the tax authority is: 34 percent higher 
for sole proprietorships and 13.2 percent higher for private corporations; 8.6 percent lower for 
firms in the service sector; 20.1 percent higher for small firms and 19.3 percent lower for large 
firms; 5.7 percent greater for firms less than five years of age; 11.9 percent lower for firms with 
no competitors; 15.4 percent and 15 percent lower for foreign owned firms and firms with 
audited financial statements, respectively.  Chan and Mo (2000) report that export oriented firms 
are more compliant but this characteristic is found to be insignificant.  Previous empirical studies 
all found a significant relationship between industry and tax non-compliance whereas only firms 
in the service industry are found to have a statistically different reporting pattern.  The direction 
of the relationship, however, is a bit surprising however it must be kept in mind that the industry
the categories included in the WBES data set are likely too broadly defined to yield any 
informative results.  For example, the service sector will include restaurants and hair salons as 
well as law an accounting firms.
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6 Conclusion
Very little is actually known about firm tax compliance due to a lack of detailed and 
readily available data.  The purpose of this paper was to use a unique and recently available 
dataset that contained information on firms from around the world to investigate some of the 
factors that effect business tax compliance.  This is one of the first studies to examine firm tax 
compliance using worldwide data.  The majority of previous empirical studies were confined to 
examining firms within a particular country using tax audit data.
The empirical strategy employed in this paper exploits the nature of the dependent 
variable, which is interval coded, and uses interval regression. The estimated coefficients from 
an interval regression are interpretable as marginal effects provided that the model satisfies the 
assumptions of correct functional form, homoskedasticity, and normality.  If these assumptions 
do not hold then the interval regression estimator of β is inconsistent.  These assumptions are 
investigated using standard diagnostic tests that have been modified for the interval regression 
model, a step frequently ignored in applied research.  The test results support the use of the semi-
log model that is corrected for heteroskedasticity, the origin of which is found to result at the 
country level and from the business type.
Overall, evidence is presented that shows that firms in all regions around the world 
engage in tax non-compliance, but that there is substantial variation within regions.  The detailed 
regression results indicate that, not surprisingly, taxes and government corruption are positively 
related to tax non-compliance and the magnitude is quite large in both cases.  Access to capital, 
political instability, organized crime, inflation, and the legal system are found to have no 
statistically significant effect on tax non-compliance.  There is also a large correlation between 
the legal organization of a business and under-reporting, with sole proprietorships and private 
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corporations being the least compliant business type.  Firm size is also correlated with tax 
compliance, with small firms reporting less and large firms more of their sales to the tax 
authority.  Firms with no competitors and government owned firms are significantly more 
compliant.
The findings do suggest a role for public policy, as well as actions to be considered by the 
tax authority and items that require further study.  First, the findings suggest that administrations 
interested in reducing business tax non-compliance should consider reducing business taxes, 
minimizing the number of regulations, and reducing, if not eliminating, government corruption.  
Admittedly, taking action of these issues is complex and involves more than just the tax 
authority.  Second, tax authorities should consider auditing sole proprietorships, private 
corporations, small firms at a higher rate and requiring all firms to have their financial statement 
audited by a third party.  Finally, based on this study, it is not entirely clear why large firms and 
firms that are less than five years of age are more compliant and how precisely exchange rates 
lead to higher tax compliance.  Further exploration into these relationships appears to be a 
worthwhile venture.  In addition, recently firm level data has been made available that was 
collected following 2000.  This data includes similar variables to those included in this study, 
including the dependent variable.  It would be worthwhile to pool these new data sources 
together with the WBES to investigate firm under-reporting in more detail.
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TABLES
Table 1a: Univariate Frequencies of Percentage of Sales Reported to Tax Authorities, 
including  missing observations
Missing <50% 50-
59%
60-
69%
70-
79%
80-
89%
90-
99%
100%
Frequency 1,879 936 694 501 703 916 1,096 3,307
Percent 18.73% 9.33% 6.92% 4.99% 7.01% 9.31% 10.93% 32.96%
Observations 10,032
Table 1b: Univariate Frequencies of Percentage of Sales Reported to Tax Authorities, 
excluding missing observations
<50% 50-59% 60-69% 70-79% 80-89% 90-99% 100%
Frequency 936 694 501 703 916 1,096 3,307
Percent 11.48% 8.51% 6.14% 8.62% 11.24% 13.44% 40.56%
Observations 8,153
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Table 2: Countries Surveyed, Categorized by Region, and Number of Observations in Each 
Country
Country Observations Country Observations
Africa and Middle East Transition Europe
Botswana 87 Bosnia and Herzegovina 104
Cameroon 45 Bulgaria 97
Côte d'Ivoire 66 Croatia 112
Egypt 102 Czech Republic 106
Ethiopia 77 Estonia 126
Ghana 85 Hungary 121
Kenya 89 Lithuania 29
Madagascar 84 Poland 208
Malawi 42 Romania 125
Namibia 66 Slovak Republic 24
Nigeria 73 Slovenia 123
Senegal 85 Turkey 124
South Africa 99 Total 1,299
Tanzania 66 Former Soviet Union
Uganda 106 Armenia 111
West Bank and Gaza 68 Azerbaijan 114
Zambia 64 Belarus 116
Zimbabwe 102 Georgia 99
Total 1,456 Kazakhstan 102
Asia Kyrgyzstan 124
Bangladesh                                                                      39 Moldova 116
Cambodia 239 Russia 481
China 85 Ukraine 188
India 160 Uzbekistan 118
Indonesia 72 Total 1,569
Malaysia 50 Latin American and Caribbean
Pakistan 80 Argentina 83
Philippines 90 Belize 33
Singapore 88 Bolivia 87
Thailand 369 Brazil 172
Total 1,272 Chile                                         94
OECD Colombia 92
Canada                                                                            95 Costa Rica 80
France 89 Dominican Republic 90
Germany 77 Ecuador 85
Italy 81 El Salvador 95
Portugal 84 Guatemala 86
Spain 89 Haiti 95
Sweden 82 Honduras 85
United Kingdom 79 Mexico 80
United States1 94 Nicaragua 86
Total 770 Panama 80
Peru 102
Trinidad and Tobago 93
Uruguay 87
Venezuela 82
Total 1,787
Notes: 1Denotes the omitted category in estimation.
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Table 3: Data Summary
Variable Obs. Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
% of Sales Reported
8153 2.978 2.166 1 7
Causes of Under-reporting
Financing 7526 0.811 0.391 0 1
Political Instability
7376 0.842 0.365 0 1
Organized Crime
7196 0.631 0.482 0 1
High Taxes & Regulations
7660 0.892 0.311 0 1
Corruption 7485 0.586 0.497 0 1
Inflation 7425 0.846 0.361 0 1
Exchange Rate 7259 0.741 0.438 0 1
Laws & Regs In consistent 8029 0.478 0.493 0 1
Legal Organization of Company
Sole Prop.
Partnerships
8153
8153
0.180
0.173
0.384
0.378
0
0
1
1
Private Corp 8153 0.280 0.449 0 1
Public Corp. 1 8153 0.130 0.336 0 1
Other Business 8153 0.154 0.361 0 1
Industry Sector
Manufacturing1 7418 0.370 0.483 0 1
Service 7418 0.424 0.494 0 1
Other 7418 0.035 0.185
Agriculture 7418 0.075 0.264 0 1
Construction 7418 0.096 0.294 0 1
Firm Size
Small 8139 0.393 0.488 0 1
Medium1 8139 0.412 0.492 0 1
Large 8139 0.194 0.396 0 1
Firm Age
<5 8153 0.257 0.437 0 1
5-151 8153 0.354 0.478 0 1
>15 8153 0.389 0.487 0 1
Number of Competitors
No Competitors 7907 0.111 0.314 0 1
1-31 7907 0.399 0.490 0 1
>3 7907 0.490 0.500 0 1
Other
Foreign Owned 8153 0.183 0.387 0 1
Gov. Owned 8153 0.120 0.325 0 1
Exporter 8153 0.339 0.473 0 1
Fin. Statements 
Audited 8153 0.586 0.493 0 1
Notes: 1Denotes the omitted category in estimation.
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Table 4: Estimation Results for Semi-log Model
Dependent Variable: Natural Log of Percentage of Sales Not Reported to Tax Authority 
Variable Model 1a Model 1b
Het. Corr.
Constant 1.185  
 (0.182)*
0.934   
(0.155)*
Causes of Under-reporting
Obstacle: Financing 0.096  
 (0.04)**
0.045   
(0.035)
Obstacle: Political Instability -0.012  
(0.048)
-0.0154   
(0.036)
Obstacle: Organized Crime 0.092   
(0.045)**
(0.065)   
(0.042)
Obstacle: Taxes & Regs. 0.212  
(0.049)***
0.202   
(0.046)***
Obstacle: Corruption 0.527  
 (0.045)***
0.534   
(0.046)***
Obstacle: Inflation -0.013   
(0.051)
0.028
(0.044)
Obstacle: Exchange Rate 0.068   
(0.047)
-0.057  
 (0.027)**
Obstacle: Laws & Regs. Inconsistent -0.067   
(0.04)*
-0.046    
(0.039)
Control Variables‡
Sole Prop. 0.211  
 (0.082)***
0.340
(0.070)***
Partnerships 0.031   
(0.077)
0.060   
(0.065)
Other 0.040   
(0.086)
0.118   
(0.083)
Private Corporation 0.131   
(0.066)**
0.132   
(0.059)**
Other Industry -0.069   
(0.136)
0.030   
(0.125)
Service -0.070   
(0.046)
-0.086  
 (0.043)**
Agriculture -0.096   
(0.083)
-0.087     
(0.080)
Construction 0.029  
(0.072)
0.041   
(0.069)
Small: <50 employees 0.174  
(0.050)***
0.201   
(0.048)***
Large: >500 employees -0.163  
(0.055)***
-0.193   
(0.051)***
<5 years of age -0.041   
(0.050)
-0.057   
(0.027)**
>15 years of age -0.063)  
(0.050)  
-0.059
(0.045)
No Competitors -0.064   
(0.065)
-0.119
(0.062)**
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>3 Competitors 0.148   
(0.060)**
0.084   
(0.053)
Foreign Owned -0.124  
(0.053)**
-0.011   
(0.036)
Gov. Owned -0.150    
(0.071)**
-0.154    
(0.065)**
Export -0.049   
(0.046)
-0.024   
(0.042)
Audits -0.239    
(0.048)***
-0.150
(0.042)***
Country Dummies Yes Yes
σ
(s.e.)
1.347  
(0.013)
-
Pseudo Log-Likelihood Value -11788.379 -11614.318
McKelvey & Zavoina Pseudo R2 0.228 -
LRT-OS
[d.o.f.; P-Value]
1357.86
[102;0.000]
16652.51
[102; 0.000]
Pseudo Functional Form Test
[P-Value]
0.001
[0.979]
-
Homoskedasticity Test of Unknown Form
[P-Value]
1111.411
[0.000]
-
Normality Test
[P-Value]
1699.6542
[0.000]
-
Observations 5393 5393
NOTES: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  d.o.f. denotes 
degrees of freedom.  Standard errors (s.e.) are noted in parenthesis.
‡  Omitted categories are Public Corporations, Manufacturing, Medium, Between 5 and 15 years of age, Between 1 
and 3 competitors, and “United States”.   
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